Blockbuster earned millions from late fees and paid for them with its promise
In 2000 Blockbuster collected about 800 million dollars in late fees and turned down the chance to buy Netflix for 50 million. A case on a revenue line that worked against the promise it was meant to serve.
Blockbuster earned millions from late fees and paid for them with its promise
01 / 3 min read
Written by a human · AI translated
Blockbuster opened its first store in Dallas in 1985 and spent the next two decades becoming the place where a household picked up its Friday night. At its peak, in 2004, it ran more than 9,000 stores around the world. Rentals came with a due date, and missing it cost money. In 2000 the company collected roughly 800 million dollars in late fees, according to figures reported by CNBC. That same year Reed Hastings and Marc Randolph offered to sell Netflix, then a loss-making DVD-by-mail service, for 50 million dollars, with Netflix running Blockbuster’s online business. Blockbuster declined.
Netflix grew on a flat monthly rate with no due dates and no late fees. Blockbuster launched its own online service in 2004, dropped late fees on rentals in January 2005 and in 2006 added Total Access, which let online members swap discs in stores. The online push slowed after a change of leadership in 2007, the debt stayed, and in September 2010 Blockbuster filed for Chapter 11. Dish Network bought what was left in 2011. A single franchised store, in Bend, Oregon, still carries the name.
A penalty charged at the moment of the promise
What did a Blockbuster customer pay for? An evening: the film you wanted, picked up on the way home, watched when it suited you. The late fee landed on exactly that part of the promise. It charged most when the customer had been busy, forgetful or simply enjoying the film for an extra day. In our vocabulary it was a contradicted value, one of the wastes we audit first: value destroyed by a touchpoint that says the opposite of what the brand says everywhere else.
Every promise is judged through its proofs, and a proof does not need to be designed to count. A fee that bills the customer for enjoying the product is a proof that argues against the promise every week. Netflix needed no clever claim to exploit it. Its offer was the same evening without the penalty, and by CNBC’s account much of its early growth came from Blockbuster customers tired of paying a dollar a day for late returns.
When the margin depends on the friction
The trap was financial before it was strategic. A revenue line that size funds stores, staff and debt service, so every plan to remove it shows up first as a hole in the budget. From inside, the fee looked like income. From the customer’s side it was the reason to leave. A company in that position can see the problem clearly and still find each year’s case for waiting more convincing than the case for acting.
The 50 million dollar offer belongs in the same picture. Buying Netflix would have meant owning the business model built against the late fee, and running it next to stores that earned from the fee. The vault reads Blockbuster through the asset conflict: the stores were its moat, and the moat was exactly what made following the customer home so expensive. Observers at the time also overrated the incumbent, anchored to a category in which the biggest chain of shelves always won.
Removing the fee without removing the doubt
When Blockbuster finally dropped late fees, it did so in a way that kept part of the old mechanism. Under the “No late fees” programme, a rental kept more than a week past its due date was charged at its selling price, and returning it within 30 days brought a refund minus a restocking fee. In March 2005 Blockbuster settled with the attorneys general of 46 states and the District of Columbia, who said the advertising had not made those terms clear. The company admitted no wrongdoing, offered refunds and promised clearer information in stores.
The settlement was small. The effect on trust was larger, because a customer who had waited years for the fee to disappear learned that a version of it was still there. Trust takes the minimum: one public contradiction weighs more than a campaign. A change meant to repair the promise reached the market as a second proof against it.
The question Blockbuster faced is common in any business where a fee, a penalty or a lock-in earns real money: which revenue lines prove your promise, and which quietly argue against it? Answering it while the line still pays is cheaper than answering it when a competitor builds an offer on the difference. If your team would struggle to sort your revenue that way, train your team to read every charge as part of the promise.
02 / Read next
No Man's Sky paid for its launch promise in a week and repaid it over ten years
Hello Games launched No Man's Sky in August 2016 below what players had been led to expect, then spent a decade adding free updates until the game reached its highest player numbers. A case on the expectations gap and the slow arithmetic of proof.
Premise, promise, proof · Autopsy · Brand history
Read articleCostco: a membership card as the premise, a hot dog as the proof
Costco charges people for the right to shop, and has kept its hot dog and soda at 1.50 dollars since 1985. A case on a premise customers pay to accept, and on a proof anyone can check at the exit.
Pricing and scarcity · Positioning · Premise, promise, proof · Brand history
Read articleFerrari builds one car fewer than the market wants, and the wait is part of the car
Ferrari has kept supply below demand for decades, with waiting lists and limited series offered to buyers chosen by their history with the brand. A case on scarcity as part of the promise, and on a moat made of time.
Moat · Pricing and scarcity · Premise, promise, proof · Brand history
Read article